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Abstract: At the beginning of the twentieth century, theorists developed approaches to Nietzsche’s 
philosophy that provided an alternative to the received view, some of them suggesting that his view of 
truth may be his most important and original contribution. It has further been argued that Vaihinger’s 
fictionalism is the paradigm within which Nietzsche’s view can be properly contextualized. As will be 
shown, this idea is both viable and fruitful for solving certain interpretive issues raised in recent 
Nietzsche scholarship. 
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1. A new paradigm 
«I believe he is much better than his reputation suggests».1 Hans Kleinpeter wrote this of 
Nietzsche in a letter to Ernst Mach dated December 22, 1911. Kleinpeter was apparently reacting 
to Mach’s biased opinion, which likely reflected how Nietzsche was received at the time: 
Nietzsche, the Antichrist and immoralist who pretend d to have finally gotten rid of Christian 
morality; Nietzsche, the philologist turned philosopher who had developed an original 
interpretation of the ancient Greeks; Nietzsche, th p ilosopher poet who wrote Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra and imagined «an overweening “superman” who – as Mach declared in The Analysis 
                                                 
* Nietzsche’s works are cited by abbreviation, chapter ti le or number (when applicable) and section number (e.g. 
GM III, 24). Posthumous fragments (NF) are identified with reference to the Colli/Montinari standard edition (e.g. 
NF 1888, 14[153]). The abbreviations used are the following: HH (Human, All Too Human), GS (The Gay Science), 
BGE (Beyond Good and Evil), GM (On the Genealogy of Morality). The translations used are from the Cambridge 
Edition of Nietzsche’s writings: The Gay Science, Cambridge University Press 2001; Beyond Good and Evil, 
Cambridge University Press 2002; Human, All Too Human, Cambridge University Press 2005; The Anti-Christ, 
Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, Cambridge University Press 2005; On the Genealogy of 
Morality and Other Writings, Cambridge University Press 2006; Writings from the Late Notebooks, Cambridge 
University Press 2003. Notes from the posthumous notebooks not available in English have been translated by the 
author. 
1 P. Gori (Ed.), Drei Briefe von Hans Kleinpeter an Ernst Mach über Nietzsche, «Nietzsche-Studien», 40, 2011, pp. 
290-298  
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of Sensations – cannot, and I hope will not, be tolerated by his fellow men».2 As is well known, 
at the beginning of the twentieth century Nietzsche’s work was mostly viewed as a prominent 
expression of the Romantic tradition, and his words were understood in the light of that 
framework. It is no surprise, then, that the representatives of the newly born scientific philosophy 
(not to be confused with the later Viennese Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung, which was a by-
product of this early movement)3 were scarcely interested in him. Kleinpeter tried to argue 
differently, however. For him, in Nietzsche’s writings (especially his notebooks) it is possible to 
find the seeds of the new philosophical perspective that scientific philosophy was trying to 
develop. Nietzsche’s view of truth agrees in particular with the anti-metaphysical approach to 
scientific knowledge defended by authors such as E. Mach, R. Avenarius, J. Stallo and W. 
Clifford, as is evidenced by the impressive semantic accordance of Nietzsche’s language with 
that of modern epistemologists.4 For Kleinpeter, the meaning they give to notions such as “true”, 
“false”, “knowledge”, etc., is in fact the same, and it reflects how they approached and interpreted 
the issue of human knowledge and, in particular, ou scientific attempt at a world-description. 
Following Kuhn, we can express this view by saying that Nietzsche lived during a paradigm shift 
and, consequently, that his language reflected the new paradigm which originated in the 
development of Kantianism and which was strongly influenced by Darwinian evolutionism.  
This is precisely what I would like to stress in this paper, for, although the most recent Nietzsche 
scholarship ultimately confirms Kleinpeter’s intuition that Nietzsche’s language was strongly 
influenced by modern science,5 interpreters have scarcely considered this fact. By neglecting the 
importance of taking a historical approach to philosophical investigations and of engaging in 
contextual interpretation of Nietzsche’s only apparently contradictory remarks, they continue to 
read Nietzsche in the light of the tradition he sought to abandon. This generates interpretive 
problems that can be avoided, especially concerning the meaning of notions such as “true” and 
“false”. Thus, let us stay with Kleinpeter and attempt to see, first, what he has in mind when he 
argues that Nietzsche defends a new philosophical perspective and, secondly, whether this allows 
us to outline the paradigm within which Nietzsche’s view of truth can be properly understood. 
                                                 
2 E. Mach, The Analysis of Sensations, Eng. transl. Dover, New York 1914, p. 25. 
3 F. Stadler, Vom Positivismus Zur „Wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung“ Am Beispiel der Wirkungsgeschichte von 
Ernst Mach in Österreich von 1895 bis 1934, Löcker, München 1982. 
4 Cf. H. Kleinpeter, Der Phänomenalismus. Eine Naturwissenschaftliche Weltanschauung, Barth, Leipzig, 1913. 
For more on this, cf. P. Gori, «Nietzsche as Phenomenalist?», in H. Heit, G. Abel, M. Brusotti (Eds.), Nietzsches 
Wissenschaftsphilosophie, De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston, 2012, pp. 345-356; andP. Gori, Nietzsche’s Pragmatism. A 
Study on Perspectival Thought, eng. trans. De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston, 2019, chapter 4. 
5 Cf. e.g. T. Brobjer and G. Moore (Eds.), Nietzsche and Science, Ashgate, Aldershot 2005; H. Heit, G. Abel, M. 
Brusotti (Eds.), Nietzsches Wissenschaftsphilosophie, c t.; C. Emden, Nietzsche’s Naturalism: Philosophy and the 
Life Sciences in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014. 
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Kleinpeter’s idea of a scientific-philosophy-friendly Nietzsche is inspired by two authors: 
Ferdinand Schiller and Hans Vaihinger.6 In 1911, Kleinpeter attended the fourth International 
Conference of Philosophy, which took place in Bologna. There, he had the opportunity to talk 
with Schiller (a great admirer of Nietzsche, according to George Stack)7 and to hear Vaihinger’s 
paper “The Philosophy of As If” (unfortunately, due to health issues, Vaihinger did not attend 
the conference personally).8 Schiller and Vaihinger are minor representatives of a “pragmatic 
turn” in the history of philosophy, mostly neglected at the time but recently revaluated and 
discussed.9 Put roughly, it is possible to say that they defended an instrumental conception of 
knowledge vs. the traditional realist common-sense metaphysics. According to them, what we 
believe to be knowledge of the external world is nothing but the elaboration of an intellectual 
framework (concepts) that allows us to manage that world. Consequently, it is not possible to 
talk of an absolute or transcendental “Truth”; that word only designates an intellectual aid which 
can be judged as more or less effective, depending on the aims and scope of the particular 
research field or practical interest within which it occurs.  
The seeds planted in Bologna were quick to bear fruit. In a 1912/13 paper, Kleinpeter remarks 
that «the currently popularised image of Nietzsche is completely wrong»10 and stresses the 
originality of Nietzsche’s epistemological relativism.11 In particular, Kleinpeter observes:  
 
if we admit that truth cannot be reached, we are foced to hold that the human mind operates, therefore thinks, with 
fictions, a conclusion that Vaihinger presents in a particularly clear way in his recently published book The 
Philosophy of “As If”. The fundamental question has been posed by Nietzsche with these words: «The aim of science 
is to define the degrees of falsehood [die Grade des Falschen] and the necessity of the basic errors [Grundirrtums] 
which are conditions of life for the representing being. Not to ask the question how error [Ir tum] is possible, but 
rather: how a kind of truth is at all possible in spite of the fundamental untruth [Unwahrheit] in knowing?»12 
 
That is to say, if one wants to understand what Nietzsche means when he talks of “truth”, 
“falsehood”, “error”, etc., one must contextualize his observations within the fictionalist 
                                                 
6 Cf. Kleinpeter’s letters to Mach, 25.11.1911 and 22.1 .1911, in P. Gori, Drei Briefe von Hans Kleinpeter a Ernst 
Mach, cit., pp. 294-297. 
7 G. Stack, Nietzsche’s Influence on Pragmatic Humanism, «Journal of the History of Philosophy», 20, No. 4, 1982, 
pp. 339-358. 
8 Cf. C. Gentili, Kant, Nietzsche und die ‘Philosophie des Als-ob’, «Nietzscheforschung» 20, 2013, pp. 103-116, p. 
104-5. 
9 On this, cf. e.g. K. Ceynowa, Zwischen Pragmatismus und Fiktionalismus. Hans Vaihingers ‚Philosophie des Als 
Ob‘, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1993, and S. Pihlström, Pragmatist Metaphysics, London: Continuum 
2009. 
10 H. Kleinpeter, Die Erkenntnislehre Friedrich Nietzsches, «Wissenschaftliche Rundschau» 3/1, 1912/13, pp. 5-9, 
p. 5. 
11 Ibid., p. 7. Cf. NF 1872-3, 19[156] and MA/I, 11. 
12 H. Kleinpeter, Die Erkenntnislehre Friedrich Nietzsches, cit., p. 8. The quoted passage is NF 1881, 11[325]. 
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paradigm, which maintains that it is not possible to conceive of “truth” in the ordinary way. 
“Truth” is at best a degree of error or falsehood, and knowledge is always “Unwahr”.13 The 
question to be answered is thus: is Kleinpeter right to stress this agreement? And would it be 
fruitful to read Nietzsche’s view of truth in the light of Vaihinger’s fictionalism? In order to deal 
with this question, we must address Vaihinger’s view directly. 
 
2. Intellectual instruments 
Vaihinger is now well known within Nietzsche scholarship. Over the past decades, studies on his 
original development of Kantianism have been published, and attention has been paid to how he 
relied on Nietzsche to provide “historical confirmation” of his own view.14 Since there is no need 
to explore this subject further, I would like to deal with a more theoretical issue, namely 
Vaihinger’s instrumentalism and his anti-realism about human and scientific knowledge. 
The main thesis that Vaihinger defends is that «appe rance, the consciously-false, plays an 
enormous part in science, in world-philosophies and in life».15 For Vaihinger, the development 
of modern physiology and cognitive psychology demonstrated what neo-Kantian authors such as 
Friedrich Lange (Vaihinger’s most important referenc ) also argued during the nineteenth 
century: «Consciousness is not to be compared to a mere passive mirror, which reflects rays 
according to purely physical laws, but consciousnes receives no external stimulus without 
moulding it according to its own nature. The psyche, t n, is an organic formative force, which 
independently changes what has been appropriated».16 Furthermore, «the mind is not merely 
appropriative» but rather «assimilative and constructive»; consequently, logical thought must be 
conceived as «an active appropriation of the outer world, a useful organic elaboration of the 
                                                 
13 Kleinpeter’s paper continues with a paragraph clearly inspired by Vaihinger’s 1911 talk, which is also published 
as “Vorbemerkungen zur Einführung” in his book. Kleinpeter especially connects Nietzsche with some conceptions 
that, for Vaihinger, determined the new philosophical framework, namely Wundt and Rickert’s voluntarism and 
Mach’s biological theory of knowledge (cf. C. Gentili , Kant, Nietzsche und die ‘Philosophie des Als-Ob’, cit.; Id. 
Hans Vaihinger e la proposta di un “positivismo idealistico”. Nietzsche e Kant nella prospettiva del “come se”, 
«Dianoia», 22, 2016, pp. 87-105; G. Gabriel, «Fiktion und Fiktionalismus. Zur Problemgeschichte des ‘Al -Ob’», 
in M. Neuber (Ed.), Fiktion und Fiktionalismus: Beiträge zu Hans Vaihingers ,Philosophie des Als Ob‘, 
Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 2014, pp. 65-87). 
14 Cf. e.g. J. Schmid, «Erkenntnis durch Fiktion. Nietzsche bei Hans Vaihinger und Max Weber», in B. Himmelmann 
(Ed.), Kant und Nietzsche im Wiederstreit, De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston 2005, pp. 373-381; C. Gentili Kant, Nietzsche 
und die ‘Philosophie des Als-Ob’, cit.; L. Ribeiro dos Santos, «The “Will to Appearance” or Nietzsche’s Kantianism 
According to Hans Vaihinger», in K. Hay, L. Ribeiro d s Santos, Nietzsche, German Idealism and its Critics, De 
Gruyter, Berlin/Boston 2015, pp. 282-295. 
15 H. Vaihinger, The Philosophy of “As If”, eng. trans. Hardcourt, Brace & c., New York 1925, p. xli. 
16 Ibid., p. 2. On the influence of experimental psychology and neurophysiology on Vaihinger, cf. K. Ceynowa, 
Zwischen Pragmatismus und Fiktionalismus, cit. p. 27 ff. 
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material of sensation».17 The intellectual products, biologically conceived as «the highest and 
ultimate results of organic development»,18 are “useful” precisely insofar as they «provide us 
with an instrument for finding our way about [orientieren] more easily in this world».19 
Once we admit that the intellect develops a creativ activity, what can be said about the world 
we pretend to “know”? Is it a “true” representation f reality or a “false” one? Is it still possible 
to speak of “truth”, “falsehood”, etc.? As a convinced instrumentalist, Vaihinger argues that the 
whole conceptual framework must be changed, that notio s such as “knowledge”, “true” and 
“false” must at least be reconceived, if not completely abandoned, since their traditional meaning 
is the expression of a completely different world-con eption. But this applies only to the «critical 
standpoint»,20 that is, the plane where the necessity of a false conceptuality is accepted and one 
finally becomes aware of the fact that we live and work with fictions. It is to those who reach 
that theoretical level that the instrumental value of our concepts is uncontroversial, although the 
relationship between concepts and world is never denie . On the contrary, the idea that the 
psychical products result from a physiological modification of “external stimuli” presupposes 
the existence of an outer reality independent of us. Therefore, it is not contradictory, in 
Vaihinger’s system, to be an instrumentalist about h man and scientific knowledge and to 
continue to speak of “falsehood” and “falsification” – that is to say, to defend a moderate version 
of metaphysical realism. Fictions actually are erroneous world-descriptions insofar as they do 
not reflect the world adequately, and this follows necessarily from how our intellect functions.21 
Critical thinking aims to overcome the traditional metaphysical commitment of the common-
sense world-conception, but it still has to deal with it. Therefore, ordinary language still makes 
sense for the new philosophers and scientists, but when attention is given to the realm of logical 
symbols, our entire semantic framework must be reconceived. 
Let us see how Vaihinger argues for all of this. «The world of ideas is essentially an expedient 
of thought, an instrument for rendering action possible in the world of reality».22 Moreover, «it 
is because our conceptual world is itself a product of the real world that it cannot be a reflection 
of reality. […] It can serve as an instrument within reality, by means of which the higher 
organisms move about. It is a symbol by means of which we orientate ourselves».23 Therefore, 
for Vaihinger we are constantly engaged in an intellectual relationship with an outer world, a 
                                                 
17 H. Vaihinger, The Philosophy of “As if”, cit. p. 2 
18 Ibid., p. 15. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., p. 177. 
21 Cf. ibid., p. 159 and 62-63. 
22 Ibid., p. 65. 
23 Ibid. 
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realm which exists independently of us but that cannot be known accordingly. In fact, there is no 
“knowledge” without a subject, and the activity of this subject cannot be isolated from the 
properties we attribute to reality. Within the limits of our actual knowledge, we only deal with 
fictions, i.e. falsifications which help us to manage external stimuli. Consequently, Vaihinger 
denies «that the world as conceived by us has value as knowledge» and holds that «what is 
fundamental is the recognition that all the more advanced conceptual constructs are merely means 
for facilitating the intercourse of sentient “beings”».24 He focuses especially on the ordinary 
notions of “picture” and “copy” and tries to show tha , from the point of view of the philosophy 
of as-if, it is not possible to conceive of the logical functions as «copies of events or processes. 
All these concepts are not pictures of events, but are themselves events. […] The world as we 
conceive it is only a secondary or tertiary construction, arising in our heads through the play of 
the cosmic process and solely for the furtherance of this process. This conceptual world is not a 
picture of the actual world but an i strument for grasping and subjectively understanding that 
world».25 
It is worth stressing that Vaihinger’s instrumentalism does not lead to scepticism or solipsism.26 
On the contrary, he was a forerunner of recent forms of constructivism and pragmatic realism. 
Indeed, Vaihinger is clear about the fact that «many fu damental scientific concepts are fictional 
and contradictory and are not a reflection of the world of reality – a world quite inaccessible to 
us –», but he also argues that «this in no way renders them valueless. They are psychical 
constructs which not only give rise to the illusion that the world is being comprehended, but 
which make it possible, at the same time, for us to orientate ourselves in the realm of actuality».27 
Furthermore, Vaihinger «insists that [these constructs] have practical value, and we regard them 
as serviceable products of the logical function, as a useful device»; however, «the theory of 
fictions teaches us that the utility of such fictions constitutes no proof of their objective truth».28 
On this basis, a redefinition of the very notion of “truth” is required. That term cannot designate 
an adequate representation, since it is not possible for us to reach something of that sort. What 
we “know” are useful symbols made up by our intellect for pure practical aims. In other words, 
«so-called agreement with reality must be finally abandoned as a criterion» of truth, and «we can 
therefore no longer talk about “truth” at all, in the usual sense of the term».29 According to the 
fictionalist viewpoint, human imperfection does not allow us either to approach objective truth 
                                                 
24 H. Vaihinger, The Philosophy of “As if”, cit. pp. 66-67. 
25 Ibid., p. 63. 
26 He in fact carefully contrasts «true criticism» to b th dogmatic and sceptical approaches (ibid., 162-3). 
27 Ibid., p. 65. 
28 Ibid., p. 66-67. 
29 Ibid., pp. 108 and 4. 
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or to discover an absolute criterion of knowledge. Given that we can only deal with a moulded 
reality, it must be admitted that «the world of ideas […] which we generally call “truth” is only 
the most expedient error, i.e. the system of ideas which enables us to act and to deal with things 
most rapidly, neatly, and safely».30 Furthermore, Vaihinger observes that «the limits between 
truth and error are just as movable as all such limits, e.g. between cold and warm. […] The 
difference between them objectively is merely one of degree».31 
Thus, the picture sketched by Vaihinger seems to be the following: there is a reality that is 
inaccessible to us; we can deal with that reality through our intellect, which is assimilative and 
constructive; the product of the psychological process is therefore a set of fictions, i.e. symbols 
or errors; these errors are means of orientation, the operational efficacy of which can only be 
judged relative to the particular interests involved case by case. Therefore, there is no “right” or 
“wrong”, no “true” or “false”, but only a set of intellectual errors which allow us to engage more 
or less fruitfully in practical activity. Once more, the focus is given to the instrumental value of 
the logical products, with no attention to the issues pertaining to radical metaphysical realism. 
Once we admit that there is a world of some sort out there and that this world acts upon us, our 
metaphysical need is satisfied, and we can focus on the only plane which actually interests us: 
that of fictions. 
Unfortunately, it is not easy to accept all of this, a  the history of philosophy shows. In fact, we 
might read post-Kantian thought as an unceasing stru gle between two opposite tendencies: the 
common-sense belief that we can know the actual featur s of reality, and the critical standpoint, 
which tries to stress the limits of human knowledge. Vaihinger pays special attention to this and 
warns his readers not to make «the greatest and most i portant human errors [which] originate 
through thought-processes being taken for copies of reality itself».32 That is to say, one must 
accept that the world as we conceive it «is only an auxiliary concept gradually formed by the 
logical function in order to take its bearings. This construction can be substituted for the actual 
world, and in practice we all do that; but it is not a picture of true reality, it is only a sign used in 
order to deal with reality, a logical expedient devis d to enable us to move about and act in the 
real world».33 The fundamental mistake of ordinary philosophy is therefore to misinterpret pure 
logical constructs as «hypotheses relating to the nature of reality», thus pretending that the psyche 
provides us with access to objective reality.34 Nothing of this sort can occur! Our intellect only 
                                                 
30 Ibid., p. 108. Cf. also p. 84. 
31 Ibid., p. 108 (my emphasis). 
32 Ibid., p. 8. 
33 Ibid., p. 63. 
34 Ibid., p. 177. 
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creates ideational aids that allow us to manage external stimuli. The value of these aids is merely 
operational, and any attempt to shift from the logical to the ontological plane – that is, to infer 
real, independently existing properties from a fictional world-description – is destined to fail. 
The way in which Vaihinger tried to «disassociate his view from rationalism or Platonism – 
indeed, from any view that would presume some reality to correspond to whatever the mind 
logically constructs»35 – intrigued contemporary philosophers of science. Some of them focused 
on how Vaihinger anticipated currently debated issue  and offered a viable solution to problems 
related to scientific realism, although he never explicitly addressed that subject itself.36 Insofar 
as Vaihinger «had actually set up institutional structures to pursue a program of philosophical 
reform and re-valuation uncomfortably close to the project of logical positivism»,37 which 
subsequently gave rise to ongoing discussions in the philosophy of science, it is possible to view 
him as a pivotal figure connecting nineteenth-century philosophy with contemporary debate. His 
interest in Nietzsche, whom Vaihinger considered a true upholder of his new conception, allows 
us to put Nietzsche into dialogue with this debate, s one scholar has recently suggested (see 
below, sec. 4). Surprisingly (but with good reason), this attempt is as viable as it is fruitful, and 
it also casts light on Nietzsche’s view of truth. 
 
3. Realism, antirealism, agnosticism 
In the Vorbemerkungen zur Einführung published in the 1911 book (and sent to the Bologna 
meeting), Vaihinger declares: «When I read Nietzsche at the end of the 1890s – I kept myself 
away from him before that time, due to bad expositins [falsche sekundäre Darstellungen] of his 
thought – I was pleased to note a strong affinity between our views of both life and the world, 
which are partially inspired by the same sources: Schopenhauer and F.A. Lange».38 This idea is 
echoed in Kleinpeter’s 1912/13 paper: the early reception of Nietzsche’s thought is criticized for 
                                                 
35 A. Fine, «Fictionalism» (19931), repr. in M. Suárez (Ed.), Fictions in Science. Philosophical Essays on Modeling 
and Idealization, Routledge, New York, 2009, p. 19-36, p. 21. 
36 E.g. M. Suárez argues that «Bas Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism can be construed as a kind of fictionalism 
about theoretical entities» (M. Suárez, «Fictions in Scientific Practice», in Id. (Ed.), Fictions in Science, cit., 2009, 
pp. 3-15, p. 3). He also observes that «Vaihinger himself was not committed to a fundamental epistemological 
difference between our knowledge of the observable world and that of the unobservable world. It is even 
questionable whether he acknowledged the antecedent distinction between observable and unobservable entities or 
domains of the world» (p. 5). G. Gabriel compares Vaihinger’s fictionalism with anti-realist views such as Van 
Fraassen’s, too, and pays attention to the idea of world-making, which can be encountered, e.g., in N. Goodman (G. 
Gabriel, Fiktion und Fiktionalismus, cit., pp. 65 and 80). 
37 A. Fine, Fictionalism, cit., p. 33. As Fine also points out, «the first use of “logical positivism” [as a synonym of 
“true criticism”] comes from Vaihinger’s The Philosophy of “As If” [p. 163]» (Ibid., p. 20). 
38 H. Vaihinger, Die Philosophie des Als ob, Reuther & Reichard, Berlin 1911, p. xiv.  
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having popularized an incorrect image of him, thus discouraging scholars who were interested in 
theoretical questions from engaging with him. On the contrary, Vaihinger argues that Nietzsche’s 
conception of truth and knowledge is as interesting as it is original; in fact, it was a forerunner of 
Vaihinger’s Philosophy of “As If” in several respects: «Nietzsche, like Lange, emphasizes the 
great significance of “appearances” in all the various fields of science and life, and points out the 
fundamental and far-reaching function of “invention” a d “falsification”. […The] Kantian or, if 
you will, neo-Kantian origin of Nietzsche’s doctrine has hitherto been completely ignored, 
because Nietzsche, as was to be expected from his temperament, has repeatedly and ferociously 
attacked Kant, whom he quite misunderstood. As if he had not also attacked Schopenhauer and 
Darwin, to whom he was just as much indebted!».39 Kant, Schopenhauer, Darwin, and Lange: 
this, according to Vaihinger, is Nietzsche’s philosophical context, out of which almost 
necessarily arises the idea «that “false” and “true” ar  “relative” concepts».40 Neo-Kantianism – 
interpreted in the light of modern physiology and psychology, as Vaihinger does – indeed 
maintains that perception and thinking are creative processes which involve the modification of 
external stimuli. Therefore, what we know is not a reflection of reality at all, but rather a 
simplification and falsification. 
Nietzsche’s remark on Kantian synthetic judgements a priori in Beyond Good and Evil 11 
confirms Vaihinger’s idea, for Nietzsche argues that «they are false judgements» and that 
«without giving validity to logical fictions, without measuring reality by the purely imaginary 
world of the unconditioned, […] without a continual f sification of the world by number, man 
cannot live».41 But the list of excerpts of this kind is long, and it leads back to Nietzsche’s early 
writings. Focusing on the most famous and relevant p ssages in which Nietzsche seems to adhere 
to a fictional conception of truth, one can first consider Human, All Too Human I, 11, where he 
argues that our language is to be blamed if we now believe «that truth has been found»; that is, 
we think «that in language [we] possess knowledge of the world». Rather, for Nietzsche, through 
language we only give things designations and do not express «supreme knowledge of things» 
at all (ibid.). Therefore, common-sense realism is a naïve conception which cannot be defended 
once we reflect critically on logical thinking and finally accept that it «depends on the 
presupposition with which nothing in the real world corresponds» (ibid.).42 This is reiterated in 
other passages from Human, All Too Human and, later, in The Gay Science, where Nietzsche 
                                                 
39 H. Vaihinger, The Philosophy of “As if”, cit., p. 342. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., p. 352. For more on this, cf. C. Gentili, Hans Vaihinger e la proposta di un “positivismo idealistico”, cit. 
42 Reflections on this, with special attention to Vaihinger’s critical standpoint, are provided in P. Gori, On Nietzsche’s 
Criticism Towards Common Sense Realism in Human, All Too Human I, 11, «Philosophical Readings» IX/2, 2017, 
pp. 207-213. 
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argues that the concepts we use to describe our world are nothing but means of making this world 
manageable to us; they result from the biological evolution of the species, and our belief in their 
value as adequate access to reality only depends on their operational efficacy (see e.g. MA/I 16 
and FW 110). In fact, as Nietzsche wrote years later in The Gay Science 354, we «simply have 
no organ for knowing, for “truth”: we “know” (or believe or imagine) exactly as much as is useful 
to the human herd, to the species». Furthermore, he famously argues that «all becoming 
conscious involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization and 
generalization»; consequently, «the world of which we can become conscious is merely a 
surface- and sign-world» (ibid.).  
This is what Nietzsche calls «perspectivism and phenomenalism» (ibid.): a conception of 
knowledge imbued by post- and neo-Kantianism, which arises precisely from the intellectual 
framework that both Vaihinger and Kleinpeter outline.43 Within that context, it was commonly 
maintained that we are physiologically structured for falsification; i.e. we select and mould the 
stimuli we receive from the outer world, which we nver reproduce adequately.44 Therefore, 
Nietzsche can easily affirm that «it does not matter what philosophical standpoint you might take 
these days: any way you look at it, the erroneousness of the world we think we live in is the most 
certain and solid fact that our eyes can still grab hold of» (JGB 34). From this remark an important 
conclusion about our evaluations follows: 
 
It is no more than a moral prejudice that the truth is worth more than appearance; in fact, it is the world’s most poorly 
proven assumption. Let us admit this much: that life could not exist except on the basis of perspectival valuations 
and appearances; and if, with the virtuous enthusiasm nd inanity of many philosophers, someone wanted to 
completely abolish the “world of appearances,” – well, assuming you could do that, – at least there would not be any 
of your “truth” 
left either! Actually, why do we even assume that “true” and “false” are intrinsically opposed? Isn’t it enough to 
assume that there are levels of appearance and, as it were, lighter and darker shades and tones of appe rance – 
different valeurs, to use the language of painters? Why shouldn’t the world that is relevant to us – be a fiction? 
(ibid.) 
 
                                                 
43 On this, cf. P. Gori, Nietzsche’s Pragmatism, cit., chapter 2. 
44 Eyesight is a good example in this regard (R. Grimm uses it in Nietzsche’s Theory of Knowledge, cit., p. 75): the 
retina filters light rays and allows us to see light only in a particular range. Therefore, we only see a portion of 
reality. No one can deny that the result of this process is not a truthful, i.e. adequate, reproduction of the external 
world, or, conversely, that it is a f lse or erroneous representation. But it is also worth noting that in this example, 
the actual features of reality are not at stake. That is, it is not possible to infer that we do not see colours as they are 
in themselves, for there are no colours in themselves. A colour is the result of a complex relationship: 1) between 
light and the object; and 2) between the light reflected by the object and an eye. Colour in and of itself does not 
emerge independently of that relationship. 
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Nietzsche’s conception is quite similar to that which Vaihinger began to develop in the 1870s. 
For both of them, the meaning of ordinary notions such as “true” and “false” must be changed, 
and we can revaluate them within the realm of appearances, i.e. intellectual errors. But this 
corresponds to how the notion of truth was reconceived at the time by authors inspired by neo-
Kantianism, such as Ernst Mach, and it was precisely this that interested Vaihinger and 
Kleinpeter. As they suggested, Nietzsche can be productively read in the light of modern science, 
as a true upholder of the new paradigm which was expected to play an important role in twentieth-
century philosophy.45 
This view of knowledge is well known within Nietzsche scholarship since it gave rise to an 
ongoing debate. The question is precisely how to interpret Nietzsche’s “falsification thesis” in 
the light of his late obliteration of the dichotomy between the “apparent” world and the “true” 
world. Furthermore, issues related to Nietzsche’s metaphysical commitments are involved; 
according to what can be called “the new received vi w” represented by scholars who accept M. 
Clark’s 1990 thesis, the idea of an “erroneous” or “false” world-description can only be affirmed 
if one accepts metaphysical realism.46 In what follows, I will try to argue that Nietzsche’s view 
on truth is a mixed one, combining anti-realism, moderate realism, and agnosticism about human 
knowledge. Pace Clark, I believe that Nietzsche never abandoned his falsification thesis and that 
he only got rid of the true vs. apparent dichotomy for intellectual purposes. The path that he 
sketches in Twilight of the Idols, “How the ‘true world’ finally became a fable” – which is so 
important for Clark’s argument – only leads to the critical standpoint, that is, to the idea that we 
work with fictions. But where do these fictions come from? To deny the very existence of an 
outer world is to reject the principles of the criti al standpoint itself. It is because we 
physiologically mould the external data that we are stuck in the apparent world. It is because of 
this that we have no access to reality. The inference to the best explanation, in this case, is to 
admit the existence of a reality that is independent of us, the properties of which we can say 
nothing about.47 Therefore, it is possible to say that Nietzsche defends a form of moderate 
metaphysical realism, although from the early to the late period he maintains that the features of 
                                                 
45 H. Kleinpeter, Der Pragmatismus im Lichte der Machschen Erkenntnislehre, «Wissenschaftliche Rundschau», 
15. Juli 1912, pp. 405-407, p. 407. 
46 M. Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990 (cf. e.g. p. 83). 
47 Nietzsche in fact talks of an external world acting on us, as Vaihinger does. Cf. e.g. NF 1886-87, 7[54]. As Nadeem 
Hussain observes (against Clark), given «the kind of empirical theories of knowledge Nietzsche would have been 
exposed to, we can see that the fact that [the] physiological accounts [he defends] “presuppose the existence of real, 
independently existing, things” [M. Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, cit., p. 123] would hardly have been 
much of a realization. It was simply part of a stand rd story about how physiology and the materialistc world view 
undermine themselves» (N. Hussain, Nietzsche’s Positivism, «European Journal of Philosophy» 12/3, 2004, pp. 326-
368, p. 334).  
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our world-description do not reflect external reality.48 In fact, he indirectly agrees with Vaihinger 
that common-sense rationalistic realism makes a terribl  mistake. For Nietzsche,  
 
the aberration of philosophy is that instead of seeing in logic and the categories of reason means toward the 
adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends (basiclly, toward an expedient falsification), one believed one possessed 
in them the criterion of truth and reality. The “criterion of truth” was in fact merely the biological utility of such a 
system of systematic falsification; and since a species of animal knows of nothing more important than its own 
preservation, one might indeed be permitted to speak h re of “truth”. The naiveté was to take an anthropocentric 
idiosyncrasy as the measure of things, as the rule for determining “real” and “unreal”: in short, to make absolute 
something conditioned. (NF 1888, 14 [153]) 
 
Nietzsche’s early critique of naïve realism is reaffirmed in this late note – a note that confirms 
that the falsification thesis is still viable for Nietzsche. Furthermore, he seems to adhere to the 
sort of instrumentalism defended by Vaihinger, who especially stresses that logical products are 
mere means of orientation. Any attempt to shift from the logical to the ontological plane is both 
dangerous and ill-founded given how our intellect functions. From this viewpoint, however, the 
very contraposition of realism and antirealism can also be overcome, and agnosticism about 
strong metaphysical realism can be defended. What actually disappears, once the dichotomy 
between the true and the apparent world is abandoned, is Nietzsche’s interest in metaphysical 
speculation. Who cares if our world-description reproduces reality adequately or not? Who cares 
if reality has properties that are independent of us? We can have no access to that realm, and 
everything we know, anything of worth to us, lies within the phenomenal world.49 Here, another 
parallelism with Vaihinger can be found. For him, intellectual concepts are a «scaffolding that 
man has erected around reality», which modern philosophers «have gradually removed from 
above. […] The logical function, when it has reached its goal, abdicates of its own free will; the 
scaffolding is cast away when its purpose has been achieved».50 Nietzsche’s anti-realism about 
knowledge can be interpreted accordingly. The reiterated idea that we are stuck in an erroneous 
and false world-image only aims to get rid of the “will to tru h” which, according to Nietzsche, 
determined the degeneration of the human type (cf. GM, Preface 6 and GM III, 24-27). Once a 
new conception of truth is achieved, once the critical standpoint is reached and we finally accept 
                                                 
48 Nietzsche’s metaphysical commitment has been explored recently by R. Sebold, Continental Anti-Realism, 
Rowman & Littlefield, London/New York 2014, chapter 5. 
49 We find this view already stated in MA/I, 9: «It is true, there could be a metaphysical world; the absolute 
possibility of it is hardly to be disputed. We behold all things through the human head and cannot cut off this head; 
while the question nevertheless remains what of the world would still be there if one had cut it off». But «even if 
the existence of such a world were never so well demonstrated, it is certain that knowledge of it would be the most 
useless of all knowledge». 
50 H. Vaihinger, The Philosophy of “As If”, cit., p. 69. 
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that truth has a merely relative value, our interest will shift to another plane, and the metaphysical 
question will give way to other issues, such as “what do we do with our truths?”, or “how can 
our truths influence our own development?”  (incidentally, look at what two thousand years of 
faith in the metaphysical value of truth has done to the human being).51 Here is where Nietzsche’s 
epistemology merges with his moral and anthropological concerns, something that Vaihinger’s 
philosophy of “as if” deals with as well. 
 
4. Fictional realism 
The similarity between Nietzsche’s and Vaihinger’s views of truth is of some help in solving 
interpretative problems related to Nietzsche’s metaphysical commitment. Vaihinger’s approach 
to the true vs. false dichotomy in fact sheds light on how Nietzsche conceived of these notions, 
given that both authors developed their epistemological considerations starting from the same 
sources, thus sharing a semantic context. What is worth noting is that – perhaps unexpectedly – 
modern developments of fictionalism are even more helpful for making sense of Nietzsche’s only 
apparently contradictory conception of truth. As Jutin Remhof recently argued, it is possible to 
interpret Nietzsche as embracing a (to Remhof’s mind consistent) scientific fictionalist view 
«according to which inexact representations, which are false, can also be accurate, or true».52 I 
have no space to discuss Remhof’s idea (which I find v able, except for the fact that he only deals 
with fictions as intellectual products and neglects the activity of sense organs, which plays an 
important role in Nietzsche and in his most influential source – F. Lange). I will only say 
something on the distinction between “literally true” and “true enough”, which follows from the 
fictional approach to model theory described by P. Teller, an approach that inspired Remhof and 
which I also consider especially fruitful for interpreting Nietzsche’s view. 
Teller’s recent radicalization of Vaihinger’s view maintains that, by embracing fictionalism, it is 
possible to accept as true a statement which is consciously false. As Vaihinger observes, this can 
be done once truth is conceived as a degree of falsehood, that is, as not referring to an objective 
reality. Teller develops this idea and argues that in science, we often make use of “useful fictions” 
without compromising «the ways in which science provides broadly veridical accounts of the 
                                                 
51 The importance of Nietzsche’s criticism of the human “will to truth” for morality has been stressed by R. Schacht, 
«Nietzsche and Philosophical Anthropology», in K. Ansell Pearson (Ed.), A Companion to Nietzsche, Blackwell, 
Hoboken/New Jersey, pp. 115-132. On this, cf. also P. Gori, Nietzsche’s Pragmatism, cit., chapter 5. 
52 J. Remhof, Scientific Fictionalism and the Problem of Inconsistency in Nietzsche, «Journal of Nietzsche Studies» 
47/2, 2016, pp. 238-246, p. 239. 
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world».53 Teller’s example is that of a map, which is «an accurate but not completely exact 
representation» of reality.54 The representation is veridical insofar as it «succeeds in representing 
things as they are»55, but it does not express an objective truth (it is not literally true). Rather, a 
veridical statement is a statement that is rue enough, that is, a statement that we accept as 
accurate «relatively to our present needs and interests, even when it is not true precisely».56 
Therefore, Teller argues that «we need to substantially rethink how we think about truth»57 and 
finally abandon the traditional view of «truth and fiction as exclusive contraries».58 Scientific 
practice in fact shows that there is space for a nuanced conception which takes care of the degree 
of falsehood one can accept as a veridical world-representation. «We accept the false statement 
as true when no harm will be done in treating the situation as if» it were precisely as we describe 
it,59 even if our description does not correspond to the actual state of affairs (think of laws in 
which ideal gases are taken into account). What is important is that we include the qualification 
“for present interests”, for «different interests will require different degrees of accuracy»60 . Yet 
this is perspectivism, that is, the idea that there are «lighter and darker shades and tones of 
appearance», and «different valeurs» that influence our world-representation (JGB 34). For 
Nietzsche, this undermines the ordinary idea «that “ rue” and “false” are intrinsically opposed»61 
and leads to the view that «exactness is not determin d by precisely specified objects independent 
of our representation of them».62 As Remhof observes, Nietzsche upholds the modern fictionalist 
view that «an inexact representation can be accurate insofar as the representation satisfies what 
we determine to be representational success»; furthermore, it is «our interests [which] partially 
constitute the constraints for assessing whether a r presentation is accurate».63 According to this 
view, it is possible to take as true a representation the falsehood of which we are conscious. 
Insofar as it leads to productive results relative o particular interests and scopes, an inaccurate 
                                                 
53 P. Teller, «Fictions, Fictionalization, and Truth in Science», in M. Suárez (Ed.), Fictions in Science, cit., 2009, 
pp. 235-247 p. 235. 
54 Ibid., p. 237. 
55 Ibid 
56 Ibid., p. 236. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., p. 240. 
59 Ibid., p. 237. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Remhof, Scientific Fictionalism, cit., p. 243. 
63 Ibid. Remhof argues that Nietzsche is committed to narrow fictionalism, which «maintains that inexact 
representations about real entities can be approximately true, while all representations about non-exist nt entities 
are false» (Remhof, Scientific Fictionalism, cit., p. 239). For Suárez (Fictions in Scientific Practice, cit., p. 13), «the 
promoters of wide fictionalism tend toward instrumentalism [and, consequently, to antirealism] in the epistemology 
of science, whereas the defenders of narrow fictionalism are friendlier toward scientific realism».  
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representation is in fact a fruitful means of orientation, and within these boundaries it can be 
accepted as veridical, i.e. true enough. 
I agree with Remhof that from this viewpoint, Nietzsche’s criticism of the value of truth and his 
reiterated acceptance of the falsification thesis do not appear to be inconsistent, but I also tend to 
believe that a moderate form of realism should be maintained. On the basis of what has been 
stated in the previous section, I think it is possible to ascribe to Nietzsche what we might call 
fictional realism, that is, a view that accepts the existence of a realm that is independent of the 
knowing subject while holding that one cannot say an thing about the actual properties of that 
realm. This view leads precisely to one of the fundamental theses of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, 
namely the idea that the only “knowable” world is that of useful or regulative fictions, which are 
literally false but true enough to be accepted as principles of a world-description.64 
                                                 
64 For a commentary on Nietzsche’s remark «inasmuch as t e word “knowledge” has any meaning at all, the world 
is knowable» (NF 1886-87, 7[60]), cf. P. Gori, N etzsche’s Pragmatism, cit., chapter 2, § 4. 
